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Abstract 
This work summarizes part of current knowledge on High-
level Cognitive process and its relation with biological 
hardware. Thus, it is possible to identify some paradoxes 
which could impact the development of future technologies 
and artificial intelligence: we may make a High-level Cog-
nitive Machine, sacrificing the principal attribute of a ma-
chine, its accuracy. 
 Introduction   
Intelligence is one of the main characteristics of the Hu-
man Brain. For example, cognitive abilities such as prob-
lem-solving, language skills, social skills, among others, 
are considered as High-level cognitive processes with a 
strong impact on different types of intelligences. Under-
standing how these abilities work can help us to implement 
desirable social behaviors in the new generation of robots 
with Human-Machine interactions. 
How do cognitive, abstract abilities and subjective expe-
rience emerge from a physical system like the brain? 
(Chalmers, 1995; Dehaene, et al. 2014; Tononi, et al. 2016) 
How can we implement these abilities in a natural form in 
machines? Is it possible? What are the requirements to 
achieve this? These are some of the most complex ques-
tions in science and to resolve them, we need to understand 
the biological basis, the cellular dynamics as well as the 
physical and mathematics basis to know the fundamental 
properties of matter which could eventually be involved in 
these emergent properties. 
One requirement for High-level cognitive abilities seems 
to be what it is called subjective experience (Barron & 
Klein, 2016) or in a more complex order: consciousness. 
For example, we first need to be conscious to take some 
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complex rational decisions, to plan, and to do something 
with intent (Baars, 2005; Tononi & Koch, 2008). How 
biology implements rational or high intelligences, is com-
pletely different from how we started to implement it in 
computer science (Moravec, 1988).     
In order to improve machines socials skills, one should 
try to understand how these abilities emerge in the brain 
and also, in order to understand how these abilities work 
and emerge from the brain, we should study how to im-
plement them into machines. This is why the last test or 
full understanding of subjective experience and conscious-
ness will be to make a conscious machine. 
This work will show a brief of what it is known about 
conscious states and some paradoxes that emerge from the 
idea of creating a conscious machine: it may be possible to 
make a conscious robot, but it does not come without a 
cost. 
Consciousness and Intelligence 
Consciousness, a brief notion  
If consciousness could be defined, the questions above 
would be easily answered. We may also have a recipe with 
different “ingredients” to explain consciousness in humans, 
animals, and accept or reject the option to implement it in 
machines. 
However, this is not the case. All of us understand what 
consciousness is, what it is to be aware, what it is to have a 
subjective experience and on which "elements" our expe-
rience is based. Sometimes these concepts are considered 
as synonyms, other times as different ideas with different 
meanings. Thus, it is needed to make some distinctions. 
The modern approach to consciousness has made a diffe-
rentiation between conscious states as different levels of 
awareness (vegetative, sleep, anesthesia, altered states, 
aware); contents of consciousness as elements or informa-
tion in the external or internal world which at times are 
part of our conscious state; and conscious processing as 
the operations applied to these contents (Dehaene, et al. 
2014). Thanks to these definitions, theories as Global 
Workspace (Baars, 2005), Integrated Information (Tononi, 
et al. 2016) and Dynamic theories (Varela, et al. 2001) 
have developed many tools leading to a greater understand-
ing of consciousness. In these approaches, the conscious-
ness and eventually intentionality are understood as an 
emergent property from brain networks dynamics.  
Nevertheless, these definitions have some difficulties 
explaining how this emergency works, explaining subjec-
tivity experiences (Chalmers, 1995; Lycan & Dennett, 
1993) or sometimes avoiding the importance of previous 
learning to develop consciousness at early stage of child-
hood (Cleeremans, 2011).  
Even though this article will refer to the above defini-
tions, as we are referring to previous works that use these 
definitions; our own understanding of consciousness, un-
like these theories, might be defined as a process of 
processes which mainly interferes with the neural integra-
tion. In this case, consciousness would be an operation 
more than a container where one might put something. It 
implies that consciousness could emerge from neural net-
work dynamics as an autonomous system (e.g. brain oscil-
lations), at a different space of action than the original sys-
tem, but with sub-emergent properties interfering with the 
space from which it originates. This work will interpret 
certain results in this direction with the intention of ex-
panding this notion in future projects. Also, while the au-
thor agrees with many of the conclusions, results and 
progresses of the theories mentioned, it is reasonable to 
consider that a new focus that integrates all of them is 
needed, since they share many similarities and are at the 
same time complementary.    
The concept of consciousness involves awareness, emo-
tions, subjectivity, intentionality, and attention, among 
others. Consciousness is formed from all of these processes 
like a differentiated and unified whole, but it is not any of 
them. For example, it could be necessary to be aware to 
have emotions and subjective experiences, or maybe vice 
versa, and we will need them to show intentionality and 
attention. We also distinguish that these are different 
processes as, for example, awareness and attention; while 
understanding all of them as constituent parts of what we 
define as consciousness. 
Consciousness and its relation with Intelligence 
Intelligence is something a little simpler to define; at least, 
many scientists think so. Intelligence can be understood as 
the ability to solve problems in an efficient way. This 
means, the maximization of the positive results in our solu-
tion while minimizing the negative impacts, for instance, 
waste of time. To do that, other processes as Learning and 
Memory are also needed and associated with the definition 
of intelligence. Learning may be understood as the process 
to gain new knowledge or improve some behavior, while 
Memory is the storage of this knowledge. To solve prob-
lems efficiently, it is necessary to access a certain memory 
that was acquired thanks to a specific learning that will be 
modifying again the memory of the system. The more in-
telligent is the system, the more it learns.   
This framework also allows finding mathematical im-
plementations of intelligence and its use in machines. Why 
could consciousness be necessary in this context? First, 
many different types of intelligences have already recog-
nized, between them, the emotional intelligence that helps 
us with social interaction. Secondly, emotions play a cru-
cial role in learning, consolidation of memories, retrieved 
memory and cognition in general (Cleeremans, 2011). In 
other words, emotions, as subjective experiences, and cog-
nition are deeply related into human intelligence 
(Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016).  
Finally, emotions and subjective experiences are also 
constitutive parts of consciousness, as stated above. This 
means consciousness and High-level cognitive abilities are 
also related. In consequence, to improve complex intelli-
gence and social behavior in machines, we should under-
stand constitutive parts of consciousness, and how its 
processes affect the computability and accuracy of the 
most powerful system that we know to date, our brains. 
What we already know  
First: The Hardware 
One simplification about the brain code is to think in the 
neuron as the principal informative unit for the brain codi-
fication and the spikes as the language of its code. It as-
sumes one kind of codification between 0, without spike, 
and 1 with a spike. 
However, now it is known that the electrical transmis-
sion through gap junctions (Bennett & Zukin, 2004) are not 
only between other neurons but also between cells as as-
trocytes (Alvarez-maubecin, et al. 2000). It is also known 
that neuromodulatory substances can reconfigure neuronal 
circuits within minutes and hours (Nusbaum, et al. 2001). 
In some cases, these substances applied in axon (Bucher, 
Thirumalai, & Marder, 2003; Goaillard, et al. 2004) can 
spontaneously initiate action potentials in a non-classical 
mode of integration. Another research has shown that ac-
tion potential in some neurons can travel backward from 
the axon and soma regions into dendrites (Stuart, Dodt, & 
Sakmann, 1993), in contrary to Polarization law. Other 
examples are: The functional complexity of dendrites and 
the roles they play, the influence of non-neuronal cells in 
the action potential propagation (Dupree, et al. 2005) and 
axon-glia communication, where the information is trans-
duced through cells that are not neurons (Fields & Stevens-
graham, 2005). Astrocytes synapses regulation (Coggan, et 
al. 2005; Dani, Chernjavsky, & Smith, 1992; Fields & 
Stevens-graham, 2005; Matsui & Jahr, 2004) and its influ-
ence on neurons and so on. All this new knowledge is not 
included in the idea of spike codification or is definitely 
contrary to it.  
These findings have shown us that the neuron is not the 
unique codification unit in the brain code and in conse-
quence the spike is not the unique key to understand its 
codification (Llinas, et al. 1998). It implies that the binary 
code is not enough to understand the brain. 
Second: Computability 
Turing and Gödel were the first in demonstrating the theo-
rem of incompleteness (Gödel, 1931; Turing, 1937). This 
theorem showed that it is not possible to resolve all the 
problems with a deductive process or algorithm. From their 
demonstrations, one of the consequences suggested is the 
potential impossibility to build conscious machines with 
algorithms only. Physiological and Psychological data also 
seem to show that this is not possible (Haladjian & 
Montemayor, 2016). This, together with point one, means 
that if we can reach the gap to build a conscious machine, 
it will not be with the algorithmic computation. A new 
computational framework will be needed. 
Third: The two Systems  
When we try to explain, on one side, the biological me-
chanisms in the brain, and on the other, the human psycho-
logical behavioral, some paradoxes appear. Some research 
and theories have shown that the dynamic of neural sys-
tems can be interpreted in a classic probabilities framework 
(Pouget, et al. 2000; Quiroga & Panzeri, 2009), like good 
estimator and predictor of external stimuli. While other 
results, principally from economic psychology, show cog-
nitive fallacies (Gilovich, et al. 2002, Ellsberg, 1961; 
Machina, 2009; Moore, 2002). These results are incompat-
ible with the classical probability theories (Pothos & 
Busemeyer, 2013).  
Hence, these disconnections between the behavior of the 
human brain and the cognitive fallacies may help to under-
stand better how the human brain works. How can some 
cognitive capabilities, with apparently non-classical dy-
namic, emerge from apparently classical systems as neural 
networks? It is necessary to answer this question as a re-
quirement to start to think in conscious machines. 
Forth: Four types of cognition 
A recent paper by Shea and Frith (Shea & Frith, 2016) 
presents a valuable differentiation between contents and 
cognitive processes (computations from some contents to 
others). These categories can be conscious or not. From the 
experimental evidence and with this framework, they de-
fine four cognitive categories (Table 1): i) Type 0 Cogni-
tion: non-conscious contents and non-conscious (non-
controlled) processing. Optimal choice is computation-
light but learning-heavy (e.g. Motor Control). ii) Type 1 
Cognition: conscious contents but automatic and non-
controlled processing (e.g. Fallacy questions). The system 
accesses to a wider range of information (Holistic informa-
tion), however some optimal calculations may become 
computationally intractable. iii) Type 2 Cognition: contents 
are conscious and the cognitive process is deliberate and 
controlled (e.g. Reasoning). It is computation-heavy, learn-
ing-light and interferes with Type 0. iv) Type ∞: non-
conscious content but conscious process. Yet no further 
definition is given as they are not sure if this category 
could exist (Supra Reasoning information).  
 
 Non conscious Processing  Conscious Processing 
Contents non conscious Type 0 Cognition Type ∞ Cognition 
Contents conscious Type 1 Cognition Type 2 Cognition 
Table 1. Types of cognition according different contents and 
processing exposed above. 
 
Fifth: The perception is a discrete process 
The perception needs time. We are conscious of a percep-
tual content in more o less 200 ms up 400 ms. Indeed, evi-
dence suggests that the conscious perception is a discrete 
process (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, et al. 
2014; VanRullen & Koch, 2003) in contrast to a conti-
nuous process. The differences between fast time 
processing for cognition type 0 (order of 40 ms) and a slow 
time processing for type 1 (order of 200 ms) have stimu-
lated the idea of the Two-Stage Model (Herzog, Kammer, 
& Scharnowski, 2016). The first stage would be a fast, 
continuous and classic probabilistic process (type 0 cogni-
tion) while the second stage would correspond to a slow 
and discrete process (type 1 and 2 cognition) due to loops 
in information processing (Figure 1). In relation with the 
discussion above, one may also say that the second stage 
would obey non-classical probabilities in some context. 
 Implications and Paradoxes  
The four types of cognitive categories, together with the 
other points that were mentioned previously, open the door 
for some new interpretations and classifications on the 
types of machines (Figure 1): 
• The Machine-Machine: It could correspond to the type 0 
cognition. The examples are the robots that we are mak-
ing today with a high learning curve. 
• The Conscious Machine: A machine with the ability to be 
conscious of its contents but not of the process. In this 
case, we will sacrifice accuracy in favor of conscious-
ness. The type 1 cognition requires integration of infor-
mation and it is a time consuming process. This is why 
the accuracy is lost instead of consciousness. However, 
is this machine useful for something? Here is the first 
Paradox. If we can make a Conscious Machine Type 1 
Cognition, this machine will lose the most important 
attribute of being a machine: the accuracy in the calcula-
tion. In this case, the machine does not work how we 
expect: it is a machine without being a machine. 
• The Super Machine: A machine with the ability to be 
conscious of its contents and own processes. This ma-
chine will have subjective experience at the same time 
that it will have the option to control the accuracy of its 
own rational process. However, the type 2 cognition 
needs more time to find accuracy solutions than type 1. 
This process also interferes with type 0 cognition, and in 
consequence robots will have less precision in motor 
tasks. In this case, one observation appears: we cannot 
expect an algorithm to control the process of emergency 
of consciousness (point 2) and we will not be able to 
control it. In other words, the machine can do whatever 
it wants; it has the power to do it and the intention to do 
it. It could be considered biological new species, more 
than a machine. The paradox is that the Super Machine 
is not useful anymore unless the machine wants to colla-
borate with us.  
• The Subjective Machine: Machine type ∞ cognition. 
Some modern progress in artificial intelligence might fit 
in this category (Bringsjord, et al. 2015). The machine 
will be conscious of each computation process but not 
conscious of the contents, at least, they will not be aware 
in the sense that we are. What does this mean? Probably 
the Machine will be able to control the computational 
processing; however it will not be able to take meanings 
of contents from these computations. In other words, the 
machine will not be able to “feel something”, to have 
“emotions”, the machine will have a type of subjective 
experience that we do not know yet. This is probably the 
evolution of machine type 0 that we are making these 
days but without the intermediate steps type 1 and 2 
cognitions. However, if this machine does not feel like a 
human, will it be able to understand us? It could be the 
kind of machine in science fiction. Again, the machine 
could be useless for our purpose and even worst, it could 
be contrary to our purposes.  
Based on these observations, it is possible to summarize 
all the paradoxes in one type: The Conscious Machine is 
not a useful machine anymore. In other words, the machine 
losses the meaningful characteristics of being a machine: to 
resolve problems with accuracy, speed and obedience. 
Some Alternatives 
It could be interesting for Artificial Intelligence to make 
Machine type 1 or type 2 cognition. Based on the prin-
ciples exposed above from biological systems, the re-
quirements are: i) new non-binary codification principles, 
ii) no deterministic computation, iii) two different systems 
of integration of information, which should be related as 
the non-classical probabilistic system emerging from the 
classical probabilistic system, iv) enough computation ca-
pability to support the first time-consuming system and the 
second non-classical system. Is it possible to respond to 
these requirements with the actual framework in Artificial 
Intelligence?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Types of cognition related with potential Systems of 
processing in the brain. 
 
Quantum computation is one of the alternatives due to 
the increase of computational capability thanks to qubits, 
non-classical probabilities and non-classical computability. 
Some alternative tools aiming to implement Quantum 
computation in analogy with brain process, might be new 
approaches of contextuality from Quantum Physics to Psy-
chology (Abramsky, 2015), like contextual semantics, nat-
ural language, and semantics of computation (Kartsaklis, et 
al. 2013). Starting from the explanation of the cognitive 
fallacies above; concept combinations, human judgments 
and decision making under uncertainty can be better mod-
eled and described by using the mathematical formalism of 
quantum theory (Aerts, et al. 2013; Busemeyer, et al. 2011; 
Sozzo, 2015; Wang, et al. 2014). This emerging domain 
has been called "quantum cognition" (Bruza, Wang, & 
Busemeyer, 2015) and these models may help us under-
stand the connection between new computational frame-
works, psychophysics, recent advances in neuroscience on 
conscious perception in the brain, and also how to make 
conscious machines.  
Conclusions 
These ideas are part of a work in progress. This work has 
developed a hypothesis based on previous works: we may 
build conscious machines but with computational costs. 
These costs reflect some paradoxes when we examine the 
requirements to build a conscious machine: it will be poss-
ible to make a conscious machine without good rational 
abilities or a good rational conscious machine with more 
time to respond accuracy. In both cases, the price of non-
obedience will be paid. The next step in this research will 
be to quantify the decrease in computational efficiency, 
time-consuming of these processes and the mathematical 
formulation of these propositions. 
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